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Abstract
A macroeconomic growth model of an occupational choice between being a dili-
gent worker and being a criminal is developed. Imperfect protection of property
rights renders agents heterogeneous in their holding wealth over time even though
they are homogeneous in the initial period. The model is so tractable that one can
explicitly derive the distribution of individual wealth and compute the Gini coefficient
analytically in the stationary state. Using the Gini coefficient, we investigate how
institutional quality affects inequality across agents in the economy. Our findings are
as follows. In the case of a relatively higher capital share, as institutional quality
improves, inequality widens in the early stage of development of institutional qual-
ity; in contrast, inequality shrinks once institutions have sufficiently matured. In the
case of a lower capital share, inequality monotonically shrinks as institutional quality
improves. Furthermore, we present government policies that reduce inequality and
achieve the first-best outcome.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate how institutional quality affects inequality
across individuals in the economy. According to the United Nations (2013), inequality in
developing countries increased by 11 percent between 1990 and 2010. This report implies
that in many developing countries, inequality across individuals remains persistent. In this
paper, we attribute persistent inequality in developing countries to institutional quality.
Figure 1 is a scatter plot that displays the relationship between institutional quality and
inequality.1 Although it does not provide information on the causality between them, we
observe their presumably negative relationship in the figure.2 We theoretically explore the
mechanism behind this observation.
[Figure 1 around here]
It is widely known that institutional quality significantly impacts economic performance
(e.g., North 1990; Knack and Keefer 1995; Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson 2001, 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). In an economy where
institutional quality is so low that property rights are not secured and personal possessions
are easily stolen by others (possibly including a corrupt government), individuals lack
incentives to work diligently. In such an economy, people are frequently robbed of their
earnings, and many of them do not hesitate to become criminals. If many people acquire
their earnings by committing crimes rather than by working diligently, the production
activities in the economy will be inefficiently implemented, being away from the production
possibility frontier. Furthermore, in the circumstances where nobody including government
1The scatter plot in Figure 1 is based on 123 countries. The data on the Gini coefficient are collected
from the dataset developed by Solt (2009, 2019). The index of “Legal System and Property Rights” in
the Economic Freedom of the World in Gwartney, Lawson, Hall, and Murphy (2018) is used as a proxy of
institutional quality. Both data are averaged over 2000-2017.
2Chong and Gradstein (2007) provide empirical evidence showing that inequality monotonically declines
as institutional quality improves. Nevertheless, one may consider the possibility that the relationship
between institutional quality and inequality is inverted U-shaped; Chong and Caldero´n (2000) empirically
show that as institutional quality improves, inequality widens in poor countries but shrinks in rich countries.
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officials rescues crime victims, the latter have no choice but to become poor; thus, inequality
across individuals widens. We model these scenarios.
In our model, each agent lives for one period and bears one offspring, as in the model
of Aghion and Bolton (1997). Then, each family line continues forever with two adjacent
generations being linked by bequest. In the beginning of a given period, an agent receives
an amount of wealth from the agent’s parent as a bequest. There are two important
characteristics to be explained in our model. The first is the whereabouts of the bequest,
and the second is the agent’s occupational choice. With regard to the bequest, there is
no technology that can be used to store wealth until the end of the period, and thus,
the agent must convert it into capital, which is used by a representative firm to produce
general goods. However, wealth may be stolen by criminals in the beginning of the period.
If wealth is stolen, the agent cannot earn interest income at the end of the period. With
regard to the occupational choice, the agent chooses to be a diligent worker or a criminal in
the beginning of the period. The presence of criminals is an essential factor that produces
agents’ heterogeneity in holding wealth, which is affected by institutional quality (measured
by the probability of criminals being arrested). If the agent becomes a diligent worker, he
or she will earn a wage income at the end of the period. If the agent becomes a criminal,
he or she joins a criminal gang and is directed to steal wealth from others by the boss of
the criminal gang. The gang converts the collected wealth into capital and earns interest
income at the end of the period. The gang evenly distributes the interest income to all
members. However, when committing a crime, any member may be arrested. Even a
member that was arrested can nonetheless receive the same amount of rewards from the
gang as do the other members.3
In equilibrium, the wage income is equal to a criminal’s earnings because of the no-
arbitrage condition between being a diligent worker and being a criminal. Such a condition
3As such, the criminal gang plays a role of insurance in our model. Although one can construct a model
such that each member of the gang is rewarded as he or she works for the gang, the analysis becomes
complicated, while the main result regarding inequality and institutional quality is unchanged.
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determines the number of diligent workers, which is less than the population in the economy
unless institutional quality is sufficiently high. The number of workers being smaller than
the total population is a source of production inefficiency. In this case, the aggregate con-
sumption is smaller and capital accumulation is limited relative to the case of employment
of the entire population. We derive not only the law of motion of the aggregate capital
but also the law of motion of individual wealth. Furthermore, we obtain the distribution of
individual wealth and the Gini coefficient that measures wealth inequality in the station-
ary state. The tractable Gini coefficient enables us to investigate the relationship between
institutional quality and inequality.
Our findings are as follows. If the capital share is relatively large, the effect of insti-
tutional quality on inequality is inverted U-shaped. In other words, in the early stage of
development of institutional quality, inequality widens as institutional quality improves.
However, once institutions have sufficiently matured, inequality shrinks with further im-
provement of institutional quality. If the capital share is small, the effect of institutional
quality on inequality is monotonic. In other words, inequality monotonically declines as
institutional quality improves. Furthermore, we identify government policies that reduce
wealth inequality and achieve the first-best outcome even though there is no strong pro-
tection of property rights.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we discuss
the related literature. In section 3, we develop a growth model of the occupational choice
between being a diligent worker and being a criminal. In section 4, we obtain the dynamics
of the aggregate capital in general equilibrium. In section 5, we derive the distribution of
individual wealth analytically in the stationary state. In section 6, we compute the Gini
coefficient that measures wealth inequality and investigate how institutional quality affects
inequality. In section 7, government policies that reduce wealth inequality and achieve the
first-best outcome are introduced. Section 8 concludes this paper.
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2 Related literature
Over the past twenty years, many researchers have studied the interaction between inequal-
ity and economic growth. In the pioneering work of Galor and Zeira (1993), a model of
agents’ occupational choices between being unskilled workers and being skilled workers in a
financially constrained economy was developed. They investigated the interaction between
inequality within an economy and macroeconomic variables such as aggregate output and
investment. By deriving multiple equilibria, the authors explained persistent income differ-
ences across countries. Subsequently, Banerjee and Newman (1993) also considered agents’
occupational choices between being workers, self-employed, and entrepreneurs, and inves-
tigated the interplay between the occupational choices and the distribution of individual
wealth. Additionally, Aghion and Bolton (1997) developed a model of economic growth
and income inequality in a financially constrained economy and analyzed the trickle-down
effect of capital accumulation. The important characteristic of all of the above studies is
that the interaction between wealth distribution and macroeconomic outcomes is investi-
gated. However, because of the nonlinearity of the dynamics of individual wealth, it is
very difficult to obtain an explicit wealth distribution analytically from the above studies’
models. Although, as in those studies, the dynamics of individual wealth is nonlinear in
our model, an explicit wealth distribution can be obtained in our model. Furthermore, one
can compute the Gini coefficient from the derived wealth distribution analytically, which
can be used to investigate the relationship between institutional quality and inequality.
In addition to the above three studies, Galor and Moav (2000) develop a model in
which income inequality arises both between the two groups of skilled and unskilled workers
and within each group. Galor and Moav (2004) develop a unified theory of the effects of
inequality on the process of development, in which physical capital accumulation is replaced
by human capital accumulation as a growth engine.4 In the model of Aghion, Howitt, and
4As in the model of Galor and Moav (2004), Asano (2012) also highlights the role of human capital
accumulation and derives a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and economic growth.
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Violante (2002), it is demonstrated that the enlarged generality of new technologies leads
to income inequality. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rı´os-Rull (2009) study the difference in
the dynamic behaviors of wealth inequality in two countries characterized by different
degrees of financial development after financial liberalization. Matsuyama (2002) develops
a model of mass-consumption economies and demonstrates that a certain level of inequality
is necessary for sustainable economic growth. There are also studies in the literature on
political economy and economic growth that deal with inequality. Among others, Alesina
and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Bertola (1993) show that inequality
negatively affects economic growth in a politico-economic equilibrium.
While the abovementioned studies mainly focus on the relationship between inequal-
ity and economic growth, Chong and Gradstein (2007, 2019) and Gradstein (2007) study
bidirectional causalities between institutional quality and inequality by developing a rent-
seeking model. Our model is not a rent-seeking model. Although we consider only a one-
way causality from institutional quality to inequality, the most important characteristic of
our model is that criminals appear endogenously depending on the extent of protection of
property rights against crimes. Then, our paper can be also related to the literature on
the economics of crimes pioneered by Becker (1968) in that the presence of criminals leads
to allocative and/or production inefficiencies. In the literature, Ehrlich (1973) investigates
the interaction between crime activities and collective law enforcement. Chiu and Mad-
den (1998) develop a model in which agents’ income may be supplemented by burglary
and demonstrate that the higher extent of income inequality leads to more burglaries.
I˙mrohorog˘lu, Merlo, and Rupert (2000, 2004) develop static and dynamic general equilib-
rium models to analyze the characteristics of criminal activities in the United States. Using
an equilibrium search model, Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003) study the relationships be-
tween crime, unemployment, and inequality. Although criminal activities are introduced in
our model as they are in the existing studies, our interest is in how the extent of protection
of property rights affects the distribution of individual wealth.
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3 Model
A closed economy consists of a continuum of agents with the total population normalized
to one, a representative firm, and a representative criminal gang. The economy continues
from period 0 to +∞ in discrete time indexed by t. Each agent lives for one period and
gives birth to one offspring; accordingly, each family line lasts forever. An agent in a
certain period may become a diligent worker or a member of the criminal gang. Whereas
all agents are homogeneous in the initial period, the heterogeneity of agents originates from
the presence of criminals, which is a source of inequality across agents. In each period, by
employing capital and workers, the representative firm produces general goods that can
be used for consumption and bequest. Meanwhile, the boss of the criminal gang directs
the members (criminals) to steal the possessions of others. The criminal gang collects the
stolen wealth and rewards the members for their misdeeds.
3.1 Timing of events
Consider the timing of events in period t from the perspective of a certain agent denoted
by i∈ Ω (or interchangeably, that of family i), where Ω is a whole set of family genealogies.
Each period is separated into two subperiods. As shown in Figure 2, there are two aspects
to be considered: first, the whereabouts of a bequest, and second, the occupational choice.
Note that production in period t occurs at the end of the period.
[Figure 2 around here]
3.1.1 Bequest
In the beginning of period t, agent i receives an amount kit of wealth as a bequest from
his or her parent (who died in period t− 1). Because there is no technology for storing the
bequest from the beginning to the end of the period, the bequest must be converted into
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capital by a one-for-one technology, which broadly includes physical and human capital.5
At the end of period t, the capital that agent i has is lent out to the representative firm
via a perfect capital market, and agent i earns interest income in the capital market in the
same period. However, agent i may have the wealth stolen by criminals before it has been
converted into capital.6
3.1.2 Occupational choice
In the beginning of period t, agent i chooses to be a worker or a member of the criminal
gang. If agent i becomes a worker, he or she earns wage income wt by supplying one unit
of labor to the representative firm at the end of period t.
If agent i becomes a criminal, he or she steals a wealth from others in the beginning
of period t. When committing a crime, agent i may be arrested with a certain probability
p ∈ [0, 1]. The criminal gang collects the wealth that criminals steal and converts it
into capital, which is lent out to the representative firm.7 The criminal gang earns interest
income from the firm, and afterwards evenly distributes the income to each member. Agent
i obtains earnings w˜t at the end of period t even if he or she has actually been arrested. In
other words, the agent’s illegal earnings are guaranteed once he or she has become a member
of the criminal gang.8 The probability of being arrested, p, is assumed to be constant for
all t ≥ 0. One can regard p as reflecting, broadly, institutional quality related to the
protection of property rights and the extent of legal enforceability in the economy. We
assume that there is no free-rider problem in the criminal gang such that criminals pretend
to be arrested without committing crimes. One should note that there is a possibility
5In other word, bequests can be used for investment projects to produce physical capital and/or for
education to form human capital. In any case, physical capital and human capital are assumed to be
perfect substitutes in this paper.
6One can consider various types of crimes agents face, including robbery, fraud, expropriation, embez-
zlement, etc.
7One can imagine that by laundering money, the criminal gang can access the capital market without
being arrested.
8It is assumed that if the agent is arrested, the prison term is sufficiently short that the agent is released
before his or her lifetime ends.
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that any member of the criminal gang steals from another member because each member
chooses his or her target randomly.
3.1.3 Consumption and bequest
Agents extract their utility exclusively from consumption and bequest that they leave to
their offspring at the end of period t. Agent i’s income, Iit, including wage income and
interest income (which may be 0 because the agent may be robbed in the beginning of
period t) is determined at the end of period t. Afterwards, the agent makes a decision as
to the quantity he or she consumes and leaves a bequest.
3.2 Production
The representative firm produces general goods by applying a Cobb-Douglas production




t where α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share, yt is the total
output, kt is the total capital, lt is the total labor, and A is the technology level of the
production function. It is assumed that capital depreciates entirely in one period. Since
the capital and labor markets are competitive, they are paid their marginal products:






where rt is a (gross) interest rate.
3.3 Criminal gang
Since lt is the population of diligent workers, the population of criminals is equal to 1− lt.
A criminal in period t randomly chooses an agent as his or her target to steal the amount of
wealth kit. For simplicity, it is assumed that any criminal does not choose an agent chosen
by another criminal and that one criminal robs one agent. As previously mentioned, there
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is a possibility that a criminal steals from another criminal. As such, 1−lt also measures the
probability that any one of agents is robbed by a criminal in period t. When committing
a crime, a criminal is arrested with probability p. The criminal gang can collect the stolen
wealth only from the criminals who are not arrested.
Because of the random choice of targets and because the probability that any given
criminal is not arrested is equal to 1−p, the law of large numbers implies that the total stolen





is the average capital stock that agents have in period t, which is equal to the total capital
stock used for production in equilibrium. Since the total amount of stolen wealth is lent out
to the representative firm, the criminal gang earns interest income (1−p)(1−lt)rt
∫
i∈Ω kitdi,
which is evenly paid to members for committing crimes. Then, the representative criminal
gang solves the following maximization problem: max1−lt(1−p)(1−lt)rt
∫
i∈Ω kitdi−w˜t(1−lt).
Because the black labor market of criminals is competitive, the zero-profit condition for
the representative criminal gang yields





Agents choose their occupations in the beginning of a period and decide how much they
consume and leave as bequest at the end of a period. Therefore, we solve their optimization
problem backwards.
3.4.1 Utility maximization







where σ ∈ (0, 1) is a weight parameter between consumption and bequest. At the end of
period t, the agent faces a budget constraint such that
cit + kit+1 ≤ Iit. (5)
Agent i maximizes Eq. (4) subject to Eq. (5). From the first-order condition, we obtain
cit = (1− σ)Iit (6)
and
kit+1 = σIit. (7)
Eqs. (4), (6), and (7) yield agent i’s indirect utility as follows:
Vit := max uit = σ
σ(1− σ)1−σIit. (8)
3.4.2 Income
An agent loses his or her interest income rtkit with a certain probability because of criminals.
Suppose that such a probability is 1 − qt. Then, the agent can retain income rtkit at the
end of period t with probability qt and loses it with probability 1− qt. It is straightforward
to show that the probability that an agent is robbed and the robber is not arrested is equal
to (1− lt)(1− p). Therefore, it follows that 1− qt = (1− lt)(1− p), or, equivalently,
qt = 1− (1− lt)(1− p). (9)
Thus, agent i’s income at the end of period t is represented as follows:
Iit =
 ωit + rtkit with probability qtωit with probability 1− qt, (10)
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where ωit = wt if agent i is a diligent worker and ωit = w˜t if he or she is a criminal. It is
assumed that the wealth in the initial period is determined exogenously, is common across
agents, and is given by ki0 = k0. Since the total population of agents is consistently equal
to one for all t ≥ 0, according to the law of large numbers, qt also measures the population
of agents who can retain interest income at the end of period t.
3.4.3 Optimal occupation
From Eqs. (8) and (10), we obtain agent i’s expected indirect utility as follows:
E(Vit) = σ
σ(1− σ)1−σ(ωit + qtrtkit). (11)
Agent i chooses his or her occupation to maximizes the expected indirect utility. Since Eq.
(11) holds for any agent i∈ Ω and E(Vit) increases with ωit, Remark 1 below immediately
follows from Eq. (11).
Remark 1. Consider any agent i∈ Ω. If wt > w˜t, agent i becomes a worker, and if
wt < w˜t, agent i becomes a criminal. If wt = w˜t, agent i is indifferent to the occupational
choice of being a worker and being a criminal.
4 Equilibrium
Given the common initial individual wealth, ki0 = k0, a competitive equilibrium is expressed
by sequences of interest rate {rt}, workers’ wage rate {wt}, criminals’ earnings {w˜t}, al-
location {(cit, kit+1)} and {kt, lt}, and agents’ occupational choices for all t ≥ 0 so that
the optimization conditions of all agents, the representative firm, and the representative
criminal gang hold and the markets in general goods, capital, and labor all clear.
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4.1 Capital market
As previously explained, the bequest received from a parent is converted into capital by a





By applying Eq. (12), we can obtain the aggregate income,
∫
i∈Ω Iitdi, as shown in Lemma
1 below.
Lemma 1. The aggregate income,
∫








Proof. See the Appendix.
Eq. (13) is consistent with national accounting because all of general goods produced in
period t are consistently distributed to agents as their incomes.
4.2 Labor market
According to Remark 1, if wt > w˜t, any agent becomes a worker, and it holds that lt = 1.
Since wt = (1− α)Akαt l−αt decreases with lt and w˜t = (1− p)αAkαt l1−αt increases with lt, if
(1 − α)Akαt > (1 − p)αAkαt ⇐⇒ p > (2α − 1)/α, all agents become workers. Otherwise,
some agents may choose to be criminals. However, if wt < w˜t in period t, no agents become
diligent workers. In this case, the marginal product of labor in production becomes infinite,
and the wage rate increases. Therefore, for workers and criminals to coexist in the economy
for all t ≥ 0, it must hold that wt = w˜t ⇐⇒ lt = (1−α)/[α(1−p)] where if p = (2α−1)/α,
it holds that lt = 1. Formally, the following lemma is obtained.
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Lemma 2. The population of diligent workers in equilibrium is given by
lt =













Proof. From the discussion immediately preceding Lemma 2, it is obvious that if p ≥
(2α − 1)/α, it holds that lt = 1. If 0 ≤ p < (2α − 1)/α, it must hold that wt = w˜t ⇐⇒
(1− p)lt = (1− α)/α for the economy to be feasible for all t ≥ 0. The last equality yields
the second equality of Eq. (14).
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. As capital share α increases, the population
of workers decreases. This is because as α increases, the interest income that the criminal
gang can earn becomes large relative to the probability of being arrested and the formal
wage rate. Then, the number of criminals increases. In contrast, as the probability of
being arrested increases, agents are more likely to choose not to be criminals, and thus,
the population of workers increases. If p is greater than or equal to a threshold, given by
(2α− 1)/α, no agents become criminals.
By applying Eq. (14) to Eq. (9), qt (i.e., the probability of not being a crime victim) is
computed as follows:
qt =









It is clear that qt increases with p. However, qt decreases as the capital share increases
because the population of criminals increases.
4.3 General goods market















The labor input given by Eq. (14) is intensively rewritten as lt = min{1, (1 − α)/[α(1 −
p)]} =: l(p), where as p increases from 0 to (2α− 1)/α, l(p) increases from (1− α)/α to 1.
Substituting lt = l(p) into Eq. (17) yields
kt+1 = l(p)
1−ασAkαt . (18)
Figure 3 presents a phase diagram for the dynamic behavior of capital given by Eq. (18).




As Figure 3 shows, in the process of economic development, the aggregate capital mono-
tonically increases and converges to the steady state when the initial aggregate capital
stock is low. One notes that if p is greater than the threshold value, (2α − 1)/α, it holds
that l(p) = 1 and capital is accumulated successfully even though the probability of being
arrested is not equal to 1 and the institutional quality is not the highest. If p < (2α−1)/α,
l(p) increases with p, which implies that capital accumulation is enhanced as institutional
quality improves.
[Figure 3 around here]
Thus far, we have investigated the aggregate capital. In the next section, we investigate
the wealth distribution in the stationary state. To do so, we obtain Proposition 1 below
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regarding the wage and interest rates in the steady state.
Proposition 1. The wage and interest rates in the steady state of Eq. (18) are given by
w¯ := (1− α)A 11−ασ α1−α (20)
r¯ := ασ−1, (21)
respectively.
Proof. The claims follow from Eqs. (1), (2), and (19).
One notes from Eqs. (20) and (21) that both wage and interest rates are independent of p.
5 Stationary state and wealth distribution
In this section, we derive the dynamics of individual wealth (bequests) and analytically
obtain the wealth distribution in the stationary state. The stationary state is defined as a
state in which the aggregate capital is equal to the steady-state value given by Eq. (19) and
individual wealth, {kit}, follows a time-invariant distribution. The idea clearly underlying
this definition is that even though macroeconomic variables such as the aggregate capital,
the aggregate consumption, and the total output become constant in the steady state, each
family’s wealth may vary over the time-invariant stationary distribution.
We investigate the relationship between wealth inequality and institutional quality by
deriving the Gini coefficient from the wealth distribution. In the following, we replace
the term “agent i” with “family i” because we consider the dynamics of wealth of family
genealogies. To focus on a meaningful situation in which there are criminals in equilibrium,
we impose the following parameter assumption throughout the following analysis.9
9Assumption 1 implies that α > 1/2. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) estimate the physical and human
capital shares. According to the researchers’ estimation, the sum of the capital shares is approximately
0.51−0.59.
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Assumption 1. The probability of being arrested satisfies the following inequality:
0 ≤ p < 2α− 1
α
.
5.1 Derivation of stationary wealth distribution
Under Assumption 1, Eqs. (7), (10), and wt = w˜t yield the law of motion of family i’s
wealth as follows:
kit+1 =
 σ (wt + rtkit) with probability qσwt with probability 1− q, (22)
where q := p+ (1− α)/α from Eq. (15). As discussed in section 4, the economy with any
initial wealth, ki0 = k0, monotonically converges to the steady state. In this process, both
wt and rt also converge to their steady-state values given by Eqs. (20) and (21). Therefore,
from Eq. (22), the law of motion of family i’s wealth in the stationary state becomes
kit+1 =
 σw¯ + αkit with probability qσw¯ with probability 1− q, (23)
where we have applied Eq. (21) to the first equation of (22). If q were equal to 1, the law
of motion of individual wealth would become kit+1 = σw¯ + αkit, and since α ∈ (1/2, 1),
kit would converge to σw¯/(1− α) for sufficiently large t. However, once family i has been
robbed in period t, it cannot earn interest income, and its wealth in period t+ 1 becomes
kit+1 = σw¯. Figure 4 shows the dynamic behavior of individual wealth in the stationary
state.
[Figure 4 around here]
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5.1.1 Wealth distribution
To obtain the support of the distribution of individual wealth in the stationary state, we
derive Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 3. Consider any family i∈ Ω. Then, under Assumption 1, family i becomes a
crime victim in some period t ≥ 0 almost surely.
Proof. The probability that family i is robbed at least once from period 0 to period t is
given by 1− qt+1. The claim follows from the fact that limt→∞(1− qt+1) = 1.
Lemma 3 implies that any family is robbed with probability 1 in the long run. Since
the law of motion of family i’s wealth follows Eq. (22), if family i with kit is robbed in
period t, the wealth that family i has in period t+1 is given by kit+1 = σwt. This outcome
yields the support of the wealth distribution in the stationary state in Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 1, the support of the distribution of individual wealth in the




Proof. See the Appendix.
We define P (j) as the population of families that have individual wealth k(j) in the stationary
state. Then, we can obtain P (j) explicitly in Lemma 5 below.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 1, it holds that P (j) = qj(1− q) for j = 0, 1, · · · ,∞.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, we can construct the distribution of individual wealth in the stationary state,
which is denoted by {(k(j), P (j))}∞j=0.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the distribution of individual
wealth in the stationary state is given by










Proof. The claim immediately follows from Lemmata 2 and 3.








respectively. One notes that the average is equal to the steady-state capital stock, which
is consistent with the capital market clearing condition. The variance depends upon the
average capital stock, k¯, which becomes greater as the average capital stock increases, which
means that the variance is not an appropriate measure of inequality.
6 Wealth inequality
In this section, we investigate the relationship between institutional quality and wealth
inequality. The explicit derivation of the wealth distribution in the previous section enables
us to derive the Gini coefficient for it.
6.1 Gini coefficient
Using the stationary wealth distribution given by Eq. (24), it is straightforward to construct
the Gini coefficient.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, the Gini coefficient regarding the weal distribution
of Eq. (24) is given by
g(q) :=
αq(1− q)
1− α2q , (25)
where q ∈ [(1− α)/α, 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
19
Because q has a one-to-one linear relationship with p that reflects institutional quality, q
also reflects institutional quality. In the following, we investigate the relationship between
institutional quality and wealth inequality. As p increases from 0 to (2α − 1)/α, q also
increases from (1−α)/α to 1. As shown in Proposition 4 below, whether the Gini coefficient
monotonically decreases or is inverted U-shaped as institutional quality improves depends
upon the capital share.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the following hold.
• If 1/2 < α ≤ (−1 +√5)/2, g(q) monotonically decreases with q ∈ [(1− α)/α, 1).
• If α > (−1 + √5)/2, g(q) increases with q ∈ [(1 − α)/α, (1 − √1− α)/α) and g(q)
decreases with q ∈ [(1−√1− α)/α, 1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 implies that if the capital share is relatively large, the Gini coefficient
is inverted U-shaped with respect to q. At the early stage of the development of institu-
tional quality, inequality across agents widens as institutional quality improves, whereas
inequality starts to shrink once institutional quality has attained a certain threshold level.
This feature may be called the institutional Kuznets curve. The inverted U-shaped Gini
coefficient is consistent with empirical evidence presented by Chong and Caldero´n (2000),
who show that institutional quality is positively linked with inequality in poor countries
and negatively linked with inequality in rich countries. In contrast, if the capital share
is relatively small, the Gini coefficient monotonically decreases with q, which implies that
inequality shrinks as institutional quality improves. The monotonic decrease in inequal-
ity with improving institutional quality is consistent with empirical evidence presented by
Chong and Gradstein (2007). Figure 5 presents charts for two examples. In panel A with
α = 1/1.2, the inverted U-shaped Gini coefficient pattern is observed, in which the Gini
coefficient is maximized when q = 0.71. In panel B with α = 1/1.8, a monotonic decrease
in the Gini coefficient is observed.
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[Figure 5 around here]
We can intuitively understand the possibility of the inverted U-shaped Gini coefficient
by looking at Figure 4. Once a family has become a crime victim, the wealth that the family
has declines to σw¯. Therefore, if the probability of being safe, q, gets smaller, the wealth
distribution is more skewed towards lower wealth, and then inequality shrinks as many
families become poor. In contrast, if q gets greater, the wealth distribution is more skewed
towards higher wealth, and inequality shrinks as many families become richer. However, if
q takes an intermediate value, the individual wealth is thoroughly distributed. In this case,
the families are more heterogeneous in holding wealths, and thus, inequality becomes high.
7 Policy analysis
In this section, we investigate whether government policy can reduce wealth inequality
and attain the first-best outcome. It is assumed that the government is endowed with
three policy instruments. The first is taxation of (or subsidization of) diligent workers’
wage income, the second is taxation of (or subsidization of) all agents’ capital income
(regardless of whether the agents are diligent workers or criminals), and the third is lump-










ωit − τ ft
)
with probability 1− qt.
(26)
In Eq. (26), τ k ∈ (−∞, 1] is the tax rate on capital income if τ k > 0 and the subsidy
rate if τ k < 0, τ ft is the lump-sum tax if τ
f
t > 0 and the lump-sum transfer if τ
f
t < 0, and
ωit = w˜t = (1 − τ k)(1 − p)αAkαt l1−αt if agent i is a criminal and ωit = (1 − τw)wt if that
agent is a diligent worker, where τw ∈ (−∞, 1] is the tax rate on wage income if τw > 0
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and the subsidy rate if τw < 0. In what follows, we focus on two cases. The first is the
case in which τ := τ k = τw > 0 and τ ft < 0 and the second is the case in which τ
k = 0.
7.1 Case 1: τ = τ k = τw > 0 and τ ft < 0
In case 1, the government implements a lump-sum transfer policy whereby the government
imposes taxes on diligent workers’ wage income and all agents’ interest income and redis-
tributes the tax revenue to all agents (regardless of whether they are diligent workers or
criminals) at the end of each period in a lump-sum manner.
Because wage income after tax is given by (1 − τ)wt = (1 − τ)(1 − α)Akαt l−αt and the
earnings of criminals are given by w˜t = (1− τ)(1− p)αAkαt l1−αt , the no-arbitrage condition
between being a diligent worker and being a criminal becomes
wt = (1− α)Akαt l−αt = (1− p)αAkαt l1−αt , (27)
which is exactly the same as in the previous section. Therefore, Lemma 2 still holds under
the current policy, and thus, the probability of not being a crime victim is given by Eq. (15).
Because of these outcomes together with a constant weight parameter, σ, that describes
the decision between consumption and bequest, Eqs. (18)-(21) still hold under the current
policy.
Assuming a balanced government budget, we obtain the government’s budget constraint
as τ(wtlt + rtkt) + τ
f
t = 0. From Eqs. (2), (9), and (27), it follows that rtkt = (1− lt)wt +
rrktqt. Then, τ
f
t = −τ(wtlt + rtkt) can be rewritten as
τ ft = −τ(wt + rtktqt). (28)




 σ[(1− τ)w¯ − τ¯
f ] + (1− τ)αkit with probability q
σ[(1− τ)w¯ − τ¯ f ] with probability 1− q,
(29)
where τ¯ f = −τ(w¯ + r¯k¯q) from Eq. (28). The same procedure as in section 5 yields the
distribution of individual wealth in the stationary state as follows:
{(k(j), P (j))}∞j=0 =
{(
σ[(1− τ)w¯ − τ¯ f ]
j∑
s=0




Furthermore, the Gini coefficient is computed as follows:
gL(q, τ) :=
(1− τ)α(1− q)q
1− (1− τ)2α2q . (31)
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Suppose also that the government runs
a balanced budget with τ = τ k = τw > 0 and τ ft < 0. Then, the Gini coefficient of the
wealth distribution decreases with tax rate, τ ; i.e., the lump-sum transfer policy reduces
wealth inequality in the economy.
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that ∂gL(q, τ)/∂τ < 0.
It is observed that although wealth inequality is reduced by the lump-sum transfer
policy under Assumption 1, this policy cannot attain the first-best outcome because it still
holds that q < 1.
7.2 Case 2: τ k = 0
In case 2, the government implements a wage subsidization policy if τw < 0 and a wage
taxation policy if τw > 0. Assuming the balanced government budget, we obtain the
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government’s budget constraint as follows:
τwwtlt + τ
f
t = 0. (32)
Because wage income after the policy is given by (1− τw)wt = (1− τw)(1− α)Akαt l−αt
and the earnings of criminals are given by w˜t = (1−p)αAkαt l1−αt , the no-arbitrage condition
between being a diligent worker and being a criminal becomes
(1− τw)(1− α)Akαt l−αt = (1− p)αAkαt l1−αt = w˜t. (33)
Based on Eq. (33), the same procedure as in section 4 yields the population of diligent
workers in equilibrium as follows:
lt = min{1, (1− τw)(1− α)/[(1− p)α]} =: l(p, τw). (34)
Proposition 6. Suppose that Assumption1 holds. Suppose also that the government runs
a balanced budget with τ k = 0 and τw = −α(1 − p)/(1 − α) + 1. Then, all agents become
diligent workers.
Proof. From Eq. (34), if τw = −α(1− p)/(1− α) + 1, it follows that l(p, τw) = 1.
In contrast to case 1, this policy affects the population of workers in equilibrium. Ac-
cordingly, by setting τw = −α(1−p)/(1−α)+1, the government can achieve the first-best
outcome, and all agents become diligent workers, correcting the production inefficiency;
additionally, wealth inequality is perfectly eliminated. One should note that under As-
sumption 1, it holds that τw = −α(1 − p)/(1 − α) + 1 < 0; i.e., the government cannot
implement wage taxation policy to achieve the first-best outcome.
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8 Conclusion
How does institutional quality affect inequality? To address this question, we develop a
macroeconomic growth model with an occupational choice. Our model demonstrates that
if the capital share is relatively large, inequality widens as institutional quality improves
in the early stage of development of institutional quality. However, once institutions have
sufficiently matured, inequality declines as institutional quality improves. If the capital
share is small, inequality monotonically shrinks as institutional quality improves. Our
model can describe developing countries where people live in circumstances without peace
and order. The policy implication of our model is that whereas policymakers should aim
to improve institutional quality to reduce inequality, there may be a possibility that the
government’s taxation and subsidies by themselves can resolve production inefficiency and
reduce inequality even though there is no strong protection of property rights.
Our model can be extended to a financially constrained economy. Whether the results
obtained in this paper still hold in such an economy is unclear. This question is left for
future research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that Γt is a set of agents who earn interest income at the end of period t without


















Define Λt as a set of agents who are diligent workers in period t. Then, the first term of the







since qt measures the population of agents in Γt and since criminals choose targets randomly,
the second term of the right-hand side of Eq. (A.1) becomes rt
∫
i∈Γt kitdi = rtqt
∫
i∈Ω kitdi =
rtqtkt, where Eq. (12) has been used to obtain the last equality. Then, using Eqs. (1), (2),
(3), (9), (12), and (A.1), we compute
∫
i∈Ω Iitdi as follows:
∫
i∈Ω
Iitdi = wtlt + w˜t(1− lt) + [1− (1− lt)(1− p)]rtkt




This is our desired conclusion.
Proof of Lemma 4
According to Lemma 3, any family becomes a crime victim almost surely. Suppose that
family i with kit is robbed in period t ≥ 0. Then, the wealth that family i has in period
t + 1 is given by kit+1 = σwt =: k
(0)
t+1. Looking forward from period t + 1 onward, we
note that Eq. (22) implies that kit+2 = σwt+1 + σ
2rt+1wt =: k
(1)
t+2 with probability q
and kit+2 = σwt+1 =: k
(0)
t+2 with probability 1 − q, · · · , kit+j+1 = σwt+j + σ2rt+jwt+j−1 +
· · · + σj+1 (Πjs=1rt+s)wt =: k(j)t+j+1 with probability qj and kit+j+1 = σwt+j =: k(0)t+j+1 with
probability qj−1(1 − q). Since it holds that rt+s → r¯, wt+s → w¯, and σrt+s → α for
s = 1, · · · j as t → ∞, it follows that k(0) := limt→∞ k(0)t+j+1 = σw¯ for j = 0, 1, · · · ,∞ and





s for j = 1, 2, · · · ,∞. Therefore, for sufficiently large t,
family i’s wealth takes one of the values in {k(j)}∞j=0. Because this outcome holds for all
families in Ω, the support of the distribution of individual wealth in the stationary state is





Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose that P
(j)
t is the population of families that have individual wealth, k
(j)
t , in period
t ≥ 1 (see the proof of Lemma 4 for the definition of k(j)t ). Eq. (22) and the law of large
numbers imply that the population of families that become crime victims in period t and
have individual wealth, k
(0)
t+1, in period t + 1 is equal to P
(0)
t+1 = 1 − q. Again, Eq. (22)




t+1 = q(1 − q), P (2)t+3 = qP (1)t+2 = q2(1 − q),
· · · , P (j)t+j+1 = qP (j−1)t+j = qj(1 − q), · · · . Or equivalently, we obtain P (j)t+j+1 = qj(1 − q) for
j = 0, 1, · · · ,∞. It follows from the last equation that P (j) := limt→∞ P (j)t+j+1 = qj(1 − q)
for j = 0, 1, · · · ,∞. Conversely, we can verify that ∑∞j=0 P (j) =∑∞j=0 qj(1− q) = 1. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3





where G(k(j)) is the cumulative distribution function of k(j), and B(j) is the cumulative
proportion of wealth relative to the total wealth, which is given by B(j) :=
∑j
ℓ=0(1 −
q)qℓk(ℓ)/k¯ according to Eq. (24). In Eq. (A.2), it is assumed for convenience that k(−1) =


















From Eq. (24), it follows that
G(k(j))−G(k(j−1)) = (1− q)qj. (A.4)
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Additionally, from Eqs. (14), (19), and (20), it follows that
σw¯
k¯
= 1− αq. (A.5)



















[G(k(j))−G(k(j−1))][B(j) +B(j−1)] = 2− 1− αq
1− α +
α(1 + αq)(1− q)2
(1− α)(1− αq2) . (A.7)
Eqs. (A.2) and (A.7) lead to our desired conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 4














It holds that g′(0) > g′((1 − √1− α)/α) = 0 > g′(1). Therefore, if (1 − α)/α ≥ (1 −
√
1− α)/α and α > 1/2 ⇐⇒ 1/2 < α ≤ (−1 + √5)/2, it follows that g′(q) < 0 in
((1 − α)/α, 1), and thus, g(q) monotonically decreases with q ∈ [(1 − α)/α, 1). If (1 −
α)/α < (1 − √1− α)/α and α > 1/2 ⇐⇒ α > (−1 +√5)/2, it follows that g′(q) > 0 in
[(1−α)/α, (1−√1− α)/α) and g′(q) < 0 in ((1−√1− α)/α, 1). Therefore, g(q) increases
with q ∈ [(1 − α)/α, (1 − √1− α)/α), and g(q) decreases with q ∈ [(1 − √1− α)/α, 1).
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Notes. This scatter plot is based on 123 countries. The data on the Gini coefficient are
collected from the dataset developed by Solt (2009, 2019). The index of “Legal System
and Property Rights” produced by Gwartney et al. (2018) is used for a proxy of
institutional quality.
Figure 1. Institutional quality vs. Gini coefficient
Figure 2. The timing of events
Notes. The bequest received from parent is converted into capital and agent 𝑖𝑖 (family
𝑖𝑖) acquires an interest income at the end of each period. However, the interest income may
be stolen by criminals. In each period, agent 𝑖𝑖 (family 𝑖𝑖) makes a decision about a
occupational choice. If he becomes a diligent worker, he earns a wage income, 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, at the
end of each period and if he becomes a criminal, he acquires a reward, �𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡, for his misdoings.
At the end of each period, agent 𝑖𝑖 (family 𝑖𝑖) makes a decision about how much he consumes
and leaves bequest to his offspring.
Figure 3. Phase diagram of aggregate capital
Figure 4. Phase diagram of individual wealth in the stationary state 
Notes. In each period, the individual wealth is stolen with probability 1 − 𝑞𝑞,
whereas it evolves with probability 𝑞𝑞.
𝑞𝑞Gini coefficient Gini coefficient
𝑞𝑞
Panel B: 𝛼𝛼 = 1
1.8Panel A: 𝛼𝛼 = 11.2
Figure 5. The relationship between institutional quality and the Gini coefficient 
